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Speech of Mr. Ewing, of Ohio,



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SPEECH.



IN SENATE OF THE U. S. *February 17 and 20, 1832.*

The resolution submitted by Mr. CLAY being under consideration, with the amendment proposed by Mr. HAYNE—

Mr. EWING said he was deeply impressed with the magnitude and importance of the subject under consideration. Aware, too, that it had received an extended and most able discussion, by men of wisdom, experience, and eloquence, I can, therefore, said Mr. E. scarcely hope to elicit any new truth, or present, in a new or more striking light, any known fact or argument which bears upon this much controverted question. Still, sir, I have thought it due to myself, and the State which I have the honor in part to represent, that I express on this floor the views which I entertain on a subject in which that State has, also, in common with the whole extended West, a deep and all pervading interest.

I regret that gentlemen, opponents of the protecting system, have thrown into the discussion much matter of a political character, wholly foreign from the question, and naturally tending to distract the mind and withdraw the attention from its calm and deliberate investigation, and especially that harsh epithets and high denunciation, have been, in part, substituted for reason and argument.

Gentlemen, who oppose the resolution offered by my honorable friend from Kentucky, assume, as a starting point, as premises from which they draw largely for their conclusions, that the tariff is *odious*; and reasons are offered, elaborate and ingenious, to prove that, in its operation, it is oppressive and unjust.

The first predicate, that the tariff is odious, (to those who hate it) is a proposition that I am not at all disposed to controvert, viewed, as it has been, by gentlemen, in a hostile and adverse spirit; with minds predisposed to see in it every thing of evil and nothing good, it is not at all surprising, whatever may be its operation, that it should still be to them abhorred and hated. Nor is it strange that a share of the odium, thus thought due to the object, should attach also to those by whom it was created and is sustained—and such seems to be the result. The policy of the friends of the tariff is, by honorable gentlemen, pronounced a cold and heartless policy; the contest between those who would prostrate, and those who would sustain it, is said to be the struggle of patriotism on the one side, and avarice on the other. And all that is hateful, and all that is hated, in this system, is, by the honorable Senator from Tennessee, (Mr. G.) attributed to, and cast upon, New England.

Sir, I stand not here to defend New England against this or any other charge. She has, on this floor, representatives of her own, much more competent than I, to do her justice. Nevertheless, it is, even to me, a subject of curious and somewhat interesting inquiry, for what peculiar cause she is now so deeply implicated by the honorable gentleman in this high political crime. If the tariff be an evil, abhorred and hateful, it would be natural to suppose that those, by whom it was first fastened upon us, should bear the weight of the odium which it involves. And was it New England that did this? The honorable Senator has already told us that New England opposed the tariff of 1824, and, sir, she did present an almost undivided front against it. Her capital was vested in other employment than that of manufactures; her enterprise directed to other pursuits; and a disposition to sudden change forms no part

of the character of her people. She, therefore, opposed it, because she believed it injurious to her interests; stoutly and firmly opposed it; but it became a law. The direction of her capital was then gradually changed, so as to adapt itself to the legislation of the country, and the tariff of 1824, which she had dreaded as an evil, proved to be a blessing. Large sums of money were invested in manufacturing establishments, vested in faith of the legislation of our country; and are the people of New England to be charged with the whole odium of this law, whenever it may be odious, merely because they saw fit to make the best of that which they could not avoid? As to the tariff of 1828, it belongs to no one; and the very features which are most objectionable, and most objected to, by the enemies of the system, were introduced by themselves, for the purpose, as it is said, of rendering it obnoxious.

But the gentleman from Tennessee complains that New England is flourishing, becoming rich, by reason of this tariff, and significantly inquires, whether this is done fairly? Now, admit the fact—admit that her wealth is accumulating by reason of this very tariff—does it afford any ground, whatever, for the charge of fraud, or artifice, insinuated against her? The tariff was passed without her concurrence, and against her will, and no means were left to avoid it. Her people, therefore, did, what, in that situation they must do, apply their labor and capital to the existing state of things; they became *manufacturers*; and the Senator from Tennessee, in his candor, admits that even *they* are entitled to something at our hands; that they should be secured from the injurious effects of frequent legislative changes; but that they should not be permitted to grow rich at the expense of their neighbors. Now, the offence of New England is, that, under the operation of a tariff, forced upon her by other sections of the Union, she still goes on increasing in wealth and prosperity; and, sir, do what we will, legislate as we may, she will still go on and prosper. The germ of prosperity is inherent in the habits and genius of this People; we may check and retard its development, but we cannot, if we would, destroy it. The Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. H.) has divined the true cause of their steady and unceasing advancement: they are active, industrious, and persevering; prudent and careful, both in great and little things; and this characteristic not confined to any class or age; it pervades the whole People; descends from generation to generation, from father to son, from mother to daughter, so as to form a prominent trait in their national character; they are an industrious People; ingenious and inventive in all the useful arts; careful and prudent in all the concerns of life. These are the leading causes of the advancement of New England; and they are sufficient to produce the effect without resorting to the suspicion of fraud, or artifice, or tricks played off upon other portions of the Union.

But, in his appropriation of the odium of the tariff, was it not a little surprising that the Senator from Tennessee should cast it *all*—yes, *all*, upon New England—New England, who had opposed it—struggled against it—and, at last, when resistance became hopeless, reluctantly yielded to its operation. Where, in the estimation of the honorable gentleman, is New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Western States?—they who arrayed their united strength in its favor, and, in truth, gave us the tariff of 1824. Where, especially, is Pennsylvania—she who, in fact, committed all the political sins now charged upon New England? The honorable Senator has passed her over in perfect silence, without one word of reproof—she who sinned most deeply, if to support a protecting tariff be a crime. But, perhaps, Pennsylvania has, in the estimation of the honorable Senator, some redeeming quality—it must be so; and yet I find myself at a loss to discover it. All those evil principles for which he has so heavily denounced New England, exist in full force in Pennsylvania. She is as extensively embarked in manufactures, perhaps more extensively—she is as rich as New England, if not richer—she has equal industry; equal frugality; a better soil; a milder climate; more mineral treasure; and is growing rich under our present system, as fast, or faster. Why is it, then, that New England is borne down by the weight of his denunciation, and Pennsylvania permitted to pass, almost without reproach? But, sir, though Pennsylvania has escaped the odium cast by the honorable Senator on some other tariff States, particularly New England, she is not, it seems, in the opinion of that gentleman, free from the moral and political contamination consequent upon the in-

roduction of manufacturing establishments. In his estimation, it would seem, that the laborer in a manufactory cannot have the soul and spirit of a freeman; that he is borne down with oppression—shrinking from the frown, and trembling beneath the lash of the task-master. The benevolent feelings of that gentleman will, I have no doubt, be gratified with the assurance, that, in all this, he is entirely deceived. He, doubtless, had in his mind what he has heard of, but, perhaps, never seen—a troop of slaves, toiling beneath the lash of the *driver*, and shrinking from its stroke. But this picture does not at all suit the condition of the free laborer of the Middle or Western States. Among them, farmers or manufacturers, it is all the same. They are, in every sense of the word, freemen; and the laborer is as free as his employer, and knows his rights as well. There is no degradation in the condition of any man, unless he be degraded by crime. The honorable Senator may, therefore, rest easy upon this subject. There is no more danger that the spirit of liberty is expiring in Pennsylvania or Ohio, than that morals are becoming extinct in New England.

But the honorable Senator has sung us a mournful palinode over our decaying navigation interest—our foreign navigation, as he says, diminishing; our coasting navigation increasing, but not in proportion to the increase of population. Again have I occasion to admire the philanthropy of the honorable Senator from Tennessee—his deep and intense feeling for the misfortunes of a section of the Union the most remote from that which he represents—misfortunes, too, which gentlemen who come from the suffering districts—who represent the principal maritime States, themselves, have never known, or felt. But I leave this matter for the present, and proceed to the discussion of my main subject—the general operation of the tariff upon our country, and especially upon its agricultural interests.

A flourishing agricultural population is the very basis of the prosperity of a nation—especially, of our republic—extended and fertile as are its fields; wide and varied as are its climes; and it is with a view to the advancement of that interest—especially, of the interest of the Western farmer—that I give to the protecting system my decided and unqualified support. Born and reared in that section of the country, which, heretofore, has been, and still is, almost exclusively, agricultural; standing in a situation in which the affairs of the husbandman, whether prosperous, or adverse, have been familiar to my observation; I know their wants, I understand their interests, and shall endeavor to speak their language.

Shortly after the adoption of the Federal Constitution, before the country had fully recovered from the shock occasioned by the desolating war of the Revolution, the troubles in Europe, growing out of the French revolution, commenced, and in their progress, and in their consequences, from that period down to the year 1818, except while suspended by the embargo, or checked by the war with England, gave to our agricultural products a foreign market, and to our navigating interest an advantage, over that of other nations, wholly unexampled in the annals of mankind. During this period, our agricultural interest prospered to a degree truly astonishing; it added to its other advantages, the introduction of a new staple, that of cotton, which flourished best on the Southern lands, least adapted to the growth of grain, or to grazing. This extended itself rapidly, and the demands of the market being for a long time beyond the supply produced, it became a source of immense and rapidly increasing wealth. Within this period of time, the settlements of the Western country, from small beginnings, advanced with amazing rapidity. Crowds of emigrants, constantly pressing into that country, formed, themselves, a market for nearly all the surplus produce of the more early inhabitants; and whatever remained beyond this, found a ready market in New Orleans, both before and after its cession to the United States.

The agricultural interest in the West, also, gained rather than lost by the late war with England, and suffered little from the suspension of foreign commerce which it occasioned. That portion of the country was, for a long time, the theatre of war, and the large supplies required for our troops were furnished by her already exhaustless granaries; while the Atlantic cities, and the manufactories of the East, received their supplies of live stock from the drovers of the West, and of corn and flour from the grain growing portions of the older States. But, after the general peace which followed the final overthrow of Napoleon; when the mighty armies which had devastated Eu-

rope were disbanded, and the soldiers which composed them returned each to his village or hamlet, to repair with his labor what he had wasted by his arms; when a few years of quiet peaceful industry had restored the energy of exhausted nations; the scene with us was changed. The fields of Europe, now cultivated in peace, produced an abundant supply for all her inhabitants, and consequently the products of our grain growing region, the Middle and Western States, could find no market there. England, after the peace, continued to purchase largely of us, and in return flooded our country with her manufactured articles, until our Eastern manufacturers were prostrated and ruined by her overwhelming competition. In 1820, 21, and 22, the amount of our grain admitted into her ports became less and less considerable, and in 1823, her ports were closed against this portion of our products.

In the mean time, causes were in operation at home, tending to the total prostration of the agricultural interest: Our manufactures were annihilated; our home market was thus cut off; the foreign ports were, in effect, closed against us; the market, which our armies had afforded the Western farmer, during the war, had ceased; that army disbanded, the soldiers became farmers, and added their quota to the vast amount of our surplus agricultural products; the only market that remained open to us was a small portion of the Eastern and Southern States, the West India Islands, and, to a limited extent, the coast of South America; consequently our produce was freighted upon the waters, and sent downwards to New Orleans, but the supply exceeded the demand twice told; the market was glutted; the price went down almost to nothing; and many a mercantile enterprise there has involved even more than a total loss. I well recollect an instance in which, after the sale of boat and cargo, and placing the proceeds to the credit of the freighter, the balance, against him, as claimed by the commission merchant, was something more than four hundred dollars. This, however, was an extreme case, but, generally, from about the year 1821, to 1825, the export trade was ruinous to all who engaged in it. The truth is, no foreign market whatever, beyond the very narrow limits which I have specified, did exist; and it was worse than idle to force our products, especially agricultural products, upon any people, beyond the amount which their necessities require. They are articles which administer to neither the pride or passions of men; so far as the necessities of a people require, they *must*, if possible, procure them; beyond this point they *will not*, however cheaply they may be obtained. It is therefore idle and chimerical to say that, "if you increase production, there will be mouths to consume it." Time may furnish them; centuries hence they may arise by millions, and gather fast upon the footsteps of production; but where were the mouths to consume the accumulated products of the West, in 1823, 24, and 25? In our own country we had them not; every market in America was filled to repletion; the ports of the British Isles were closed against us. The North of Europe grows corn to an extent far beyond the wants of the country, and, at the time of which I am speaking, felt, and as extensively as we, the pressure consequent upon over production; and the markets upon the Baltic and the North Sea were supplied by the corn of Poland, from the ports of Dantzic and Konigsburg; southward, the products of the fertile countries upon the Danube, the Dnieper, and the shores of the Euxine, meet us at the Straits of Gibraltar, and shut us out of the Mediterranean.

In short, every portion of the world was searched by our intelligent merchants, and all combined did not furnish a market adequate to our surplus productions. Every farmer in Ohio long knew and felt the pressure consequent upon this state of things. Year after year their stacks of wheat stood unthrashed, scarcely worth the manual labor of separating the grain from the straw; so low was it reduced, in comparison with manufactured articles, that I have known forty bushels of wheat given for a pair of boots; such was the state of things in the Western country, prior to, and at the time of, the revision of the tariff in 1824.

About the same time, unless I am much deceived, like causes produced similar effects, though to a less extent, on the cotton planting interest in the South. The Hon. Senator from South Carolina, (Mr H.) has said that "cotton is an article the production of which cannot be overdone." Sir, the gentleman is mistaken; do but consider how many portions of the earth produce

the article to the full measure of the wants of its inhabitants, and even beyond them; take into view, also, the capacity of several of those countries, especially our own, for increased—nay, almost unlimited production, and compare this with the capacity of the inhabitants of those countries, to which our cotton, or the fabric produced from it, can find access, to purchase and consume; he will find, unless I am much deceived, that of all articles, (tobacco perhaps excepted) cotton is one, the production of which is *most likely* to be overdone.

The whole of our present export, is loosely estimated at one million of bales; most of this is sold in England, and forms the principal supply for the British manufactures. Now that nation, with its dependencies, a most extensive consumer, is, in the first place, abundantly supplied with the manufactured article; and moreover, I ask you if there is a spot on the habitable globe, where her manufactured articles can find a market, that it has not already penetrated, and supplied to the full extent of the demand? What portion of the earth is there, where civilized or even savage man is to be found, who has any thing to give in exchange for their fabrics, which has not been already sought out and furnished, even to repletion? Europe, America, the Islands of the Pacific and Southern Oceans, Arabia, Hindostan, the further India, and even China itself, are visited by her merchants, and flooded with her fabrics; the price of which has been long since reduced below that of every other article used for clothing, so that the cost has not, for many years past, prevented any people, even the poorest, from purchasing to the extent of their wants, or at least to the extent of their commodities which would be received in exchange.

The amount of our exports of cotton has been already stated at one million of bales; our home consumption may amount perhaps to two hundred and fifty thousand bales; making, in the aggregate, one million two hundred and fifty thousand bales, as the whole product of the United States—the average product of a little more than one million of acres of land. There is, in the cotton region of the United States, more than twenty millions of acres of land adapted to the production of this staple, besides a very large portion of the Texas, which is settling with our people, and becoming our rival in this product. If the demand for cotton had been unlimited, and if the fall of price, consequent upon over production, did not, in its turn, re-act upon, and check production itself, in a few more years the production of that article would increase more than ten fold. Such is the natural course of things. The great extent of new and fertile lands, constantly exposed to sale at the lowest price; the ease with which a great portion of them is brought into cultivation, and the abundant crops which they yield, with the energy and enterprise of the migrating portion of our people, would yield a vast, incalculable amount of this product, for which this earth may be searched in vain to find a market. That the fall in the price of cotton, the leading cause of all the distress complained of in South Carolina, is owing to over production, and not to the tariff of 1824, is evident from some further facts. In 1818, our whole exports of cotton amounted to ninety-two millions of pounds, and produced thirty-four cents per pound. In 1823, the amount of the export had augmented to one hundred and seventy-three millions of pounds, and the price had fallen to eleven cents. Now, a part of this astonishing reduction in the price of the article in so short a time, is, I admit, accounted for by the rise in the price of money, equivalent to nearly one third; deduct this, which every one will admit a liberal allowance, and the fall in price, consequent upon over production, or, what is the same thing, the producer of the raw material furnishing it faster than it could be wrought up by the manufacturer, is more than one half in five years: as, in the case of grain, the consequence or at least the tendency of this over production, and the glutting of the foreign markets, has been the reduction of the price of the article to the minimum at which it could be produced. Indeed the effect of an excessive supply of any article of commerce, is much greater than we would be at first led to believe; the smaller quantity, which falls short of the demand, generally producing more than the larger quantity, which exceeds it. As, for instance, the exports of cotton from the United States, in 1818, which amounted to ninety-two millions pounds weight, an amount, I conclude, less than the market required, brought thirty-one millions of dollars. The amount exported in 1827, was two hundred and ninety-four millions of pounds—an amount greater than could readily find a market, and brought

but twenty-nine millions of dollars. And this, in truth, rests upon a plain and common principle of barter; we see it in all the operations, of life. Wood, for example, became scarce in this city, in consequence of the early closing of the navigation, and immediately rose to an enormous price; now, suppose this city to require one thousand cords of wood per week, during the winter months; as long as that quantity continued to be regularly offered in the market, the sellers and the buyers would be upon a footing of equality, and the article would command a fair-price. Suppose, again, the supply to fall short one hundred cords per week, the wants of the city continuing at one thousand cords, and the supply being but nine hundred; in this case, the sellers would have the advantage of the purchasers, and would fix their own price; the nine hundred cords would sell for more than one thousand; and suppose, the wants of the city remaining the same, that the regular supply should amount to one thousand one hundred cords per week, which would be a weekly excess of one hundred cords of the supply over the demand; the market becomes glutted, the producers anxious to sell; the consumers, careless about purchasing, necessarily bring down the price, and the one thousand and one hundred cords weekly furnished to the city, being beyond their wants, brings a much less sum in the aggregate to the country which furnishes it, than would nine hundred cords, an amount below their wants. The same principle applies to commerce every where, whether it be on a great or a limited scale; it is to that, a law, as constant and controlling in its operation as the law of gravitation to the motions of the heavenly bodies.

Then, sir, at the period of which I am speaking, 1822, 23, and 24—which I refer to as the season of the greatest agricultural depression, especially in the West—we had supplied, and were supplying, every country upon the globe with our products, to the extent they would receive, and even beyond it. We had glutted every market, and by the excess of the supply which we furnished, we lessened the aggregate sum which we received in return. This was the case with every article of our products, whether of the forest or the field: every thing which we had to export, or which our labor would produce, and which could be made the subject of exchange, was sent abroad, and exchanged for foreign manufactured articles. And, in every instance, our excess in production and excessive exportation, on the principle already explained, lessened the amount of the foreign article, which we were able to pay for and receive in exchange. In this state of things, it is evident that increased agricultural production could not add to, but rather tend to diminish, the aggregate of national wealth. The simple products of the earth cannot be hoarded and made a lasting treasure; the wants of the present, and a small excess to meet the contingency of a failing crop in any coming year, is all that is ever, of choice, amassed; the residue is disposed of for such price as it will command, and the increase of quantity, as I have shown, would necessarily diminish that price.

In this state of things, with a large amount of labor and capital, which were worse than cast away, if applied to agricultural pursuits, it was clearly the policy of the nation, if that object were within the compass of its powers, to direct the excess of that labor and capital to manufacturing. Suppose the surplus which could be withdrawn from agriculture, without diminishing the value of our exports of its products, to be one hundred thousand men and one hundred millions of dollars—and the supposition is doubtless much below the actual amount—suppose these men and this capital be directed to the manufactory of iron, and produce, yearly, the value of ten millions of dollars, which, being an article of necessity, we must otherwise have imported from Europe; is it not obvious, at a single glance, that, although this money and labor may not be employed as profitably to the individuals themselves, as while it was applied to agriculture, that the whole of its product—this ten millions per annum—is so much capital annually created in our country by the direction thus given its industry? Most clearly so; as every other interest yields the same, or even a better product to the nation than before; we receive for our cotton, tobacco, rice, and flour, exported to foreign nations, as much, at least, as if the capital and labor, above supposed, had continued in agriculture; and, instead of importing iron to the value of ten millions of dollars, as we should otherwise have done, our merchants return with its va-

lue in other articles of necessity or comfort. But this ten millions of annual wealth, created by the establishment of these manufactories, is not confined to them alone; it distributes itself through all portions of the community, by various interchanges—but of this hereafter.

It is difficult to reason closely on a subject so extensive, and involving such various relations. I like the familiar case put by the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. G.) and will adopt a similar one, which is easy of comprehension, and will serve to illustrate the views which I have advanced. Suppose a farmer placed upon his farm with ten sons, all sturdy lads, able to bear a hand at any business he may choose to set them about; and suppose that he can raise on his farm, with the labor of eight of them, as much produce of every kind as he can sell at all the markets to which he has access; now, with the money which he gets for his produce, he must pay his shoemaker and his blacksmith, besides purchasing such other articles as his family stands in need of. In this case, would he not find it for the common interest of his family to make one of his boys a blacksmith and the other a shoemaker, and leave the other eight to carry on the farm? It would be a clear saving to the family of all that the two boys would earn at their trades, and it is a principle of domestic economy which one of our Ohio farmers would easily understand and readily apply. The same is the case with the nation, but on a more extended scale; and what the father would do for his family, the Government should do for the nation—not directly, for that could not be done without an interference with private right; but indirectly, by addressing itself to private interest.

The state of things which I have dwelt upon somewhat at large, was that of our whole country in 1823-4. It was in the situation of the farmer, with his ten boys, who could find employment but for eight; and such, more especially, was the situation of the Middle and Western States. The low state to which our farming interest was reduced, the low price to which our fine lands and the products of our lands had sunk, produced unexampled pecuniary distress, and called aloud for relief. Our statesmen were not slow in discovering the cause of the evil, and in applying the remedy; hence their united support of the tariff of 1824—the merit of which I claim for them—for the Middle and Western States; and will not agree that it shall be transferred, as a subject of either praise or blame, to New England.

The effects anticipated from the tariff, were such as have, in fact, followed it, and which, it is fair to say, resulted from it. Men and capital were transferred from agriculture to manufactures. In those sections of the Union, as New England, in which the land is poor and unproductive, and which abounds in capital, and is thickly peopled, their manufactures, which had once been prostrated by a ruinous competition, revived, and new ones were, to a vast extent, established. The competition of their labor and their capital was withdrawn from the farming interest, and that section of the Union, instead of contributing her mite, as before, to crowd and glut the market of the large Atlantic cities with the products of agriculture, herself, thereafter, furnished the best and most certain market for the rich products of the West.

The Senator from Tennessee has said that this interference of Government, in giving a direction to private capital and individual industry, is oppression—it is injustice. I am now viewing this subject in its bearing on the nation generally, as a national subject, without special reference to its operation on any particular sections of the Union, and in that view I shall reply to his objection. He admits that the constitution has vested the power in Congress to pass tariff laws, with a view to the protection of manufactures—in short, to pass the very law which he stigmatises as oppressive, and for the very purpose for which it was passed. Now, if it be within the constitutional powers of Congress, and be for the general good—the promotion of the prosperity of the whole—I cannot, for myself, conceive on what sound principle it can be called oppressive. Indeed, it carries with it none of those features which, though salutary, are often odious, as operating to restrain the exercise of individual will—the freedom of individual action. The tariff does not even this; but, by a regulation, which I trust I have shown to be for the good of the whole, it holds out inducements to individuals to so direct their labor and devote their capital, as that it shall advance the interest of the individual, and, at the same time, redound to the general good. So far from being oppressive,

it is one of the best attributes or principles of action of a wise, patriotic, and paternal Government. No one is *constrained* to leave his agricultural pursuits and become a manufacturer. Agriculture is still open before him, with increased advantages. Manufacturing interest invites him, with even better prospects; and it is this, the hand of beneficence—the hand of Government—which is extended to save the sinking hopes of its citizens, that the honorable Senator stigmatises as the hand of *oppression*. It will be seen that the hypothesis on which I proceed—and one which is abundantly supported by facts—is, that we still export, of all our agricultural products, to the full extent of the demands for them in foreign countries; that we are, therefore, able to pay for and import from abroad the products of foreign countries, to as great an extent as we could do if our whole population were confined to agriculture; and that all the products of our home manufactures are so much clear yearly addition to the aggregate of our national wealth.

But it is urged by the Senator from S. C., (Mr. H.) that, as the American tariff checks the importation of British goods into the United States, it thereby lessens the ability of the British manufacturer to pay for our commodities, and reduces the amount of our *raw material* (cotton) which is purchased in England: for which loss, our substituted home market is, as he says, no sufficient equivalent. But that I may not misinterpret the honorable Senator, I take the liberty to quote his own language, from page eleven of his printed speech.

“Now suppose, to make this matter too plain for cavil or dispute, that we “exported to Great Britain one hundred thousand bales of cotton, worth, (at “thirty dollars a bale) three millions of dollars, and that we received, in “exchange, three millions of dollars worth of British cotton goods, how much “of our cotton would it take to manufacture these goods? Why, just twenty- “five thousand bales; while the remaining seventy-five thousand bales would “be disposed of on the continent. But, suppose the importation of these “goods to be prohibited, and that they should be made at home, what por- “tion of this cotton would find a home market? Only twenty-five thousand “bales; and the remaining seventy-five thousand bales must be left upon our “hands.”

I will admit, for the present, for the sake of argument, that the manufacturers of the twenty-five thousand bales of cotton in the United States, into cotton goods, worth three millions of dollars, prevents the importation of just that amount of cotton goods from England, and that it would, consequently, diminish the sales of the British manufacturer to precisely that amount. He would, therefore, want twenty-five thousand bales of raw cotton less, to make the fabric to supply his remaining customers, and, therefore, he would *purchase* just so much the less of the raw material. If, then, the United States were the only country in the world that sent raw cotton to Great Britain, the home market for the twenty-five thousand bales would be purely a substituted market, without adding any thing to the aggregate demand. But when it is considered that a large amount of the cotton of which the coarser fabrics are made, are grown in other countries, as Brazil, Egypt, Greece, and Hindostan; and as our domestic fabric substitutes, principally, those of the coarser kind, formerly imported from England, the American cotton, it will be obvious, does, to this extent, displace the cheaper and poorer article of Brazil, Egypt, &c. and makes, almost to the extent of the amount manufactured, a *new*, rather than a *substituted* market for our raw material.

But the seventy-five thousand bales, the value of which has been already realized in the United States by the manufacturing of the twenty-five thousand, and which, the gentleman says, must remain on our hands, because we will not purchase British cotton goods, is certainly wanted by the British manufacturer, of which to make the fabric to supply his customer on the continent; and on his hypothesis, this 75,000 bales of raw cotton, worth two millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, will make cotton cloth, which the manufacturer can sell for nine millions of dollars. If he do not purchase he cannot manufacture or sell; and will he give up his market on the continent, and refuse to manufacture for Europe, because we will not permit him to do so for us? The gentleman is widely mistaken in his calculation of consequences. The British will manufacture to the full supply of all who will

purchase their fabrics, and they will purchase the raw material of those who sell the best article at the cheapest rate, to the full extent of the wants of their manufacturers, and this too without inquiring what nation takes, or refuses to take, their cotton fabrics in exchange. The argument proceeds upon a false hypothesis; it supposes Great Britain to be a poor nation, which has little to offer us in exchange for what she purchases, and that she buys of us all she can *pay* for, rather than all she wants. The very reverse is the fact. England is rich, and we, with all our prosperity, are, comparatively, poor. There is more than wealth enough, amassed upon that single island, to buy the tee simple of the whole continent of America. She therefore buys of us all that she *wants*, and we buy of her all that we can pay for; and the amount of our purchases is but little diminished by the establishment of manufactories at home, and the exclusion of many of their articles from our market. They still have enough, which we wish to purchase, to command all our means of payment; but, by furnishing ourselves with articles of necessity, we rise, in our importations from abroad, to those of comfort and convenience, and perhaps, of luxury. Hence, the *balance of trade*, heretofore, has been, and still is, and, do what we can, will long continue to be, against us, and in favor of England. I agree with the Senator from Tennessee, that this balance of trade, of which so much has been said and written, cannot be very accurately ascertained from the custom house books; but there is one criterion which is unerring—the *rate of exchange* between the two countries. Bills upon England sell at a premium equivalent to the expense and risk of transporting specie. I am aware that our exchange tables do not state this difference correctly; their error arises from a wrong mode of reducing dollars to shillings and pence; but correct this error, and the difference of exchange is still large enough to indicate a clear balance of the *direct* trade between us and England, in favor of that country. We make it up, it is true, by a favorable balance in our trade with other countries—for no nation can, for a long time, buy more than she pays for: but so long as this balance continues in her favor, and against us, there is no danger that she will not be able to purchase all of our raw material which it may be for her interest to consume. One thing struck me as singularly inconsistent in some of our anti-tariff politicians. It will be recollected, that one reason urged for the tariff of 1824, was, that England shut her ports against our bread stuffs, and, by excluding the only exchangeable articles of the Middle and Western States, put it out of their power to purchase her commodities, except by a constant drain of the precious metals. The tariff was, therefore, proposed as a measure of retaliation, or, rather, of self preservation, from the ruinous effects of the British commercial system. On the other hand, it was said that the measure would be impolitic and ruinous; that if other nations restrained their commerce, it was no reason why we should fetter ours; and that the laws of foreign nations, whatever they might be, could form no proper ground for legislation on our part. But now our tariff, which excludes some articles of British goods, in favor of the home manufactured article, operates so oppressively upon England, that it not only justifies, but must produce, retaliatory measures on her part. “If” (said the honorable Senator from South Carolina) “you exclude British goods from our markets, you, in effect, exclude our cotton from their markets. It is in vain to tell us that England must have our cotton. You may force her to do without it. Even now she supplies herself to a great extent from other countries—from her East India possessions, Egypt, Brazil, and elsewhere, and you will make it her interest, in the end, to give up the American trade entirely.”

Now this does not seem to me exactly sound and consistent reasoning. When British legislation operates hardly upon our own country, we are asked to submit to it with patience, for it is folly to retaliate; but, on the other hand, when our legislation, in like manner, touches, or seems to touch, Old England, retaliation on her part is just and necessary, and we make it her interest to give up our trade altogether. But, sir, these fears are chimerical. There is no danger of a present or future inability, on the part of England, to buy all that we have to sell, provided she wishes to purchase, without turning the balance of trade against her and in our favor; she has done it heretofore, down to the present moment, and I venture the prediction that

she will continue to do so for the coming age; and while this can be done, she will adopt no measures to cut off or embarrass the commerce between the two nations—I mean that commerce only which does not interfere with the home industry of England—for that industry it has always been her policy to protect and foster, and by its protection she has accumulated wealth beyond human conception. I take it, then, as an established position, that the protecting system, and the consequent establishment of manufactures, has not reduced, in any respect, or in a single particular, except as before conceded, the foreign market for our domestic products.

Gentlemen say that the tariff has checked the cotton growing interest; compelled the people of the old States of the South to abandon, in part, the production of their staple, and turn to the cultivation of grain and the growing of live stock, a portion of their land; and thereby cut off from the West a valuable market, which they once furnished for its products. Now this is, I conceive, attributing to the tariff effects which it has had no agency whatever in producing. I have already shown that the fall in the price of cotton, prior to 1824, was owing chiefly to over production; that is a mischief, however, which naturally tends to correct itself. When, in consequence of over production, the price of cotton became low, it could no longer be produced except on the better quality of lands; consequently, a part of the lands of North and South Carolina, not well adapted to the culture of cotton, but which had been forced into the service by excessively high prices, have been turned to pasture or the growth of grain—this tends to diminish their demand for Western produce, as they become, to some extent, their own producers of the articles, of which they were formerly the purchasers; and, with or without the tariff, the same thing would have taken place.

But the tariff has, in fact, limited the production of cotton, and, thereby, helped to sustain the price, which must otherwise have sunk much below its present minimum; it has effected this by creating and fostering a new interest, that of the sugar planter, who occupies the soil and climate which is best adapted to the growth of cotton, and which would otherwise have been confined to its culture. There is now not less than one hundred thousand acres of the richest of our Southern lands appropriated to the culture of the cane, which, in cotton, would have produced an average of one hundred thousand bales per annum; this would have been thrown in upon the market, in addition to the excess with which it has been constantly surcharged, or it would have driven out of its cultivation a quantity of less productive land, in the older sections of the country, capable of yielding the same annual amount, probably not less than two hundred thousand acres of the Carolina lands. This section of the Union, then, has been specially benefitted in its export trade, by the protecting system; no part of the Union has thereby suffered any loss or injury in that particular, but, as I heretofore remarked, the nation, as a whole, is able to pay for by an exchange of our products with foreign nations; and import, of their manufactured articles, as much as we could have done, without our system of protection. The products of our manufactures are, therefore, so much additional wealth created and brought into being by the protective system. If I be correct in the view of the subject which I have taken, our foreign commerce, and our tonnage employed in commerce with foreign countries, ought not to have diminished without some other cause to account for such diminution: for it is not of the nature of this system, if its parts be properly adjusted, and if it operate upon our national prosperity as it would seem to me it must—it is not of the nature of this system to cause a diminution of our foreign commerce or navigation; and its tendency is greatly to increase the coasting trade; and facts will, on examination, be found accordant to this position.

The wars in Europe, to which I have already adverted, gave us, it will be recollected, for a long series of years, the carrying trade for almost half the world; during its continuance, and prior to the embargo, our tonnage, employed in foreign commerce, increased with unexampled rapidity, and, in 1806, and in 1807, it rose to an amount considerably beyond what it has reached at any subsequent period. But this forms no fair ground of comparison—extraordinary causes conspired to produce extraordinary effects. On the other hand, during our last war, in 1814, our tonnage employed in foreign commerce

was reduced to one-fifteenth part of its present amount; but this, too, being produced by a cause, temporary in its nature, and unconnected with the advancement or decline of the resources of the nation, may be cast out of the account. But, from 1816 down to 1824, our tonnage employed in foreign commerce remained nearly stationary, with, however, some slight diminution; but, from 1824, the date of the first *obnoxious tariff*, to the present time, the tables show a considerable increase—there is clearly no falling off in consequence of the tariff; our tonnage employed in the coasting trade has, in the mean time, nearly doubled, and its efficient value much more than doubled, indicating an increased interchange of commodities between the different sections of the Union, much beyond the proportionate increase of population. Add to this the increased facilities of transportation, occasioned by improvements *which have been made* in the communication between different points upon our rivers and bays, and the use of steam navigation to a vast extent, which has all arisen since 1816—one ton of which, in the transport trade, is equivalent to perhaps four tons of common sail vessels; if we also take into view the steam boat navigation between Pittsburg, Cincinnati, Louisville, and New Orleans, which is, in effect, the coasting trade of more than three millions of our population, the result will show an increase, in a duplicate ratio to that of our population, altogether indicative of a prosperous and flourishing domestic commerce. This increase, since the tariff of 1824, has been in a much greater ratio than that in the same number of years immediately preceding it; since that time, too, there has been a steady advance (with some variation, occasioned by the cotton speculations in 1825) in the cash value of our *exports* and *imports*, neither increasing in a less ratio than they did prior to that year.

I think it clear, then, that none of the great interests of our country has produced less of actual wealth, than it would have done without the tariff. That all the wants of our people have been supplied from agriculture, so far as it, alone, can administer to the wants of man, leaving an excess of product as large as could be advantageously disposed of abroad; that our commercial and navigating interests have been sustained, or, rather, advanced; and that, therefore, all the products of our manufactories, of what nature soever, and made at whatever cost, which are occasioned by the tariff, are so much actual wealth created by them, and given to the nation. It will be obvious, at once, that, in the view of the subject here presented, the *cost* of production is wholly immaterial, in a national point of view—the quantity and value of the article produced, is alone important; for that is the aggregate amount, by which the national wealth has been augmented. Let us take the case heretofore supposed, of one hundred thousand men and one hundred millions of capital, which could be withdrawn from agriculture, without diminishing the value of its products. It would certainly be wiser, in a national point of view, that they should be withdrawn from that employment, and directed to something in which their labor could be productive, even though it produced but little. Admit that capital would produce six per cent. per annum, and that the laborers could earn one hundred dollars each, if employed in agriculture; and that the same, if directed to manufacturing, would produce but three per cent. on the capital, and fifty dollars a year to the laborer, still it would be for the benefit of the *nation*, that the hundred thousand men and the hundred millions of dollars should be applied to manufactories; for, while the laborers and capitalists were *individually* realizing *more* profit, by agriculture, they were yielding *nothing* to the aggregate of national wealth. On the other hand, while they individually make much *less* profit by manufacturing, they are constantly adding the *whole product* of their labor to the wealth of the nation. The men and capital, which still remained employed in agriculture, would make as much wages and profit as all made, when all were engaged in it; they would, of course, divide among them the ten millions of dollars which would have been earned by the hundred thousand laborers, and the six millions, which would be the profit on the hundred millions of capital. It would, then, be the interest of the remaining agriculturists, if they could not otherwise induce this part which I have named to engage in manufacturing, to give them, as a bounty, *ten* of the *sixteen* millions, which would be saved to them by getting clear of this excess of labor and capital. Now, this is supposing a strong case against the protecting system; it supposes it to bring the home

manufactured article at more than twice the cost of the imported, and yet the national interest is, even on that hypothesis, clearly advanced by protection. Take the case of the Great Falls Factory, referred to by the honorable Senator from South Carolina; concede against it all that is alleged, wide as it is from the fact, and test its utility by the principles which I trust I have established, and it will be found to be a case of national benefit, rather than a burthen. 790 boys, men and females, produce 6,000,000 yards of cotton cloth from 1,250,000 pounds of cotton. The cloth, at a moderate estimate, would be worth eight cents per yard average, equal to - - - \$480,000
Deduct the price of cotton, at 10 cents, - - - 125,000

375,000

Deduct 3 cents per yard for increase of price by reason of the tariff, 180,000

Leaves, \$195,000

As a clear augmentation of national wealth—that much more made to the *nation*, by employing these 790 laborers in this factory, than if they had been employed in agricultural labor. I have thus far reasoned on the supposition that the tariff *does* raise the price of the protected article, and that to the full extent insisted on by the opponents of the protecting system. In this point of view I have endeavored to show, and I trust successfully, that it is a general benefit, and adds to the aggregate of national wealth, without regard to the high or low prices which it may affix to the protected article. If, however, the prices of the protected articles were greatly, or permanently *enhanced*, and if they were produced in one section of the Union to the exclusion of another, I am free to admit that its operation would be unequal; *might be* oppressive upon some portions of the Union, while it tended to the emolument of the Union as a whole. If, however, after a reasonable time has transpired for capital and labor to assume its direction and produce its effect, the protected article is produced as cheap, or cheaper than it could be sold, had we never resorted to protection, no section of the country is injured, while the prosperity of each and every part of it is advanced. It is said that the only rational object of a protecting duty is, to raise the price of the protected article, for the benefit of the producer; that it is its natural and necessary tendency; and if it do not have that effect it is a dead letter, and that manufactures would flourish as well without it as with it.

Plausible as these propositions are, and specious as is the reasoning by which they are supported, they are nevertheless unsound in theory, and unsustained by experience.

It is not the rational object of the protecting system, even in the first instance, during the infancy of our manufactures, to raise the price of the article, but to secure to the domestic product the *command of the market*. Suppose, sir, that the regular annual demand for a given article, coarse cottons, for example, were five millions of dollars per annum, in the city of Philadelphia, and suppose that amount regularly imported from England, and sold at ten cents per yard—suppose that the same article can be manufactured in Philadelphia, profitably, at ten cents per yard, is it yet certain that a manufacturer could sustain himself against the foreign competition, without the protection of Government? In my estimation, it is perfectly certain that he could not. In the first place, the foreign manufacturer and the importer have possession of the market, and cannot be driven from it unless they are undersold. The domestic manufacturer must, therefore, put down his goods below the selling price, in order to obtain the market from his rival, and sell *below* the price at which a fair profit could be realized. But the foreign manufacturer and the importer, whose business it is to supply this market, will not yield it at once to any rival; they, to keep possession of the market, put down the article also, and thus competition lowers it, until one or the other is ruined: and I need not tell you, on which that ruin must fall. Between capitalists, when they contend on equal grounds, as between every other species of power, wielded with the same energy, directed by like intellect, the stronger must overthrow the weaker. The same contest would arise in the attempt to sustain our manufactures (when established) without protection, in the face of foreign competition. The imported article would con-

stantly divide the market with the domestic; it would subject our manufactures to the fluctuations in price consequent upon the occasional over-production of the foreign fabric; and as prompt sales are necessary to enable small capitalists to carry on business with success, it would put it out of the power of our domestic manufacturers to produce and sell the fabric as low as they could do, if foreign competition were restrained or removed. Every one who has any knowledge of the application of capital, is aware of the importance of a frequent and certain return of the fund vested with its profit; if it be regularly turned once a year, eight or ten per cent. is a fair profit upon it at each operation; if three times in a year, three or four per cent. is equally good; but if there be hazard of delay, or of loss, the capitalist will not take the risk unless the profits are likely to be excessive: so that our manufacturers, when pressed by foreign competition, subjected to delay, and exposed to loss, cannot produce as cheaply as they can when secured from this inconvenience and risk. And although they may produce and sell even cheaper than the article would have been sold, had they never engaged in the business, yet they may not be able to go down with the article to the price to which it must sink in consequence of the competition which they have caused.

Upon the well settled principle, that the relative proportion of demand and supply fix, or modify, the price of all articles, however produced, the increased production consequent on the extensive establishment of manufactures in the United States, must necessarily reduce the price of the manufactured article in the markets of the world; and, should we admit the free importation of foreign manufactured articles, this state of things, if it could exist, would more especially reduce them in our own country.

This competition would operate most unfortunately upon our manufacturers, in another particular. We all know the immense extent to which cotton fabrics, for example, are produced in England. There are, in the first place, their own home market, that of their colonies and dependencies, which they supply without competition; there are also a few other markets, which they almost entirely command. Now, over production, or an excessive supply, owing to any temporary cause, puts down the price, as I have heretofore shown; and the excess in quantity, if exposed in the market, and, owing to any exigency of trade, requiring prompt sale, reduces the value of the aggregate supply, so as to be more than lost in the general mass. If, then, there be an excess of production at any time, which must be disposed of, on whatever market it may be crowded, its immediate effect is, to sink the value of all the stock of the same material in the same market, to, or nearly to, the price at which that may be put, in order to force a sale; or it compels other dealers to keep up their stock, and wait for a better state of things, and thus interrupts and disturbs the regular and steady business of the place. Now, in case of over-production, or a sudden press to dispose, to a large amount, and immediately, of any manufactured article by the British manufacturer, it would, by the policy of trade, be thrown, not upon a market which they regularly and wholly supplied, but on those which were principally supplied by other producers. Thus, all the depression and irregularity consequent upon over-production by the British manufacturers, would be cast upon ours, if they were left without protection, and their ruin and destruction would be the inevitable consequence. Our manufacturers have not sufficient capital to stand the shock of this competition. If they have quick, certain, and steady sales, they can manufacture many of our protected articles as low, or lower, than the same can be imported from England; but they cannot endure, and they ought not to be forced to withstand, the vicissitudes of fortune which the British manufacturer, and the British laborer, are heir to, and which would be cast, with increased effect, on our shores, if they were not guarded and protected by the legislation of our country. These, sir, are the reasons why the friends of the protecting system will not consent to destroy the protection on articles which can be, and which are, produced cheaper now than they would have been imported, had we never given it this protection. To the question, put with so much emphasis—if the domestic articles do, in fact, sell as low as the foreign, why keep on the protecting duty? I answer, by the inquiry, Why take it off? You certainly gain nothing by removing it, and I have shown you that you may lose much,

I trust, sir, I have sufficiently shown, that, when protection is essential to sustain our domestic manufactures, it is not a *necessary* consequence of that protection, to enhance the price of the protected article. It may, or may not, produce that effect, according to circumstances, and the fact can be tested only by experience. Let us try it by that touchstone. The friends of the policy contend that the system of protection has reduced the prices of protected articles *below* what they would have fallen to without this protection. Their opponents deny it. The proof, already adduced, and reiterated, is certainly very strong—to my mind, conclusive—in favor of the affirmative of the position. But it is not at all necessary to go thus far; the friends of the system need not show that the tariff has *reduced*, it is sufficient that it has not *enhanced* the price of the protected article. On those who attack the system as an evil thing, it is incumbent to show, that it is productive of some evil; it is not enough that they deny it one or another of the good effects which its friends have claimed for it. I have already shown that no single evil has resulted, or can result, from this system, unless it *increase* the price of protected articles. And, it seems to me, admitted, by even the gentleman from South Carolina, that it has not had this effect. To this point, I read from pages 24 and 25 of his printed speech: “But where is the evidence to be found, that the tariff has produced any reduction whatever in the price of the protected articles? Is there any other foundation for the assertion than this, that the prices of cottons, woollens, and iron, have actually fallen since 1824? But all other articles have likewise fallen, protected and unprotected. Real and personal estate, cotton, flour, and tobacco, all, all have gone down; and most of them, in a greater degree than woollens, cottons, and iron. Has the tariff done all this? What say the gentlemen? I have here a price current containing the prices of two hundred and fifty articles, in 1816 and 1831, from which it appears that there has been an universal reduction in the price of articles of every description; and that those admitted duty free, have been reduced, at least, in an equal ratio with those paying duties.”

Now, sir, admit the gentleman to be correct, and it is all I need ask as a friend and advocate of the protecting system—if the protected articles [those paying heavy duties] have held their relative situations in price, with those paying no duties, it is evident that the duty has not enhanced the price of the protected articles, and does not, therefore, operate as a burden on any portion of the People; and all that is said about oppression and injustice, and burdening the many for the benefit of a few, is but idle declamation. But the honorable Senator, a little further on, hazards the conjecture, that, if his tables of prices current were carefully examined, it would show, that there has been a less reduction in the protected articles than in the others. On this conjecture, sir, hangs his whole case. If it be not well founded, supported by facts, neither the South, nor any other portion of the Union can have the least cause of complaint against this system; and I venture to say, that the contrast is not very striking in favor of the unprotected articles, or, in the hands of the honorable Senator, it would not have been permitted to rest in mere conjecture. It cannot be sufficient to spread ruin and desolation over any portion of our land. Other tables, however, not perhaps of those identical years, show a different general result. A striking contrast in the reduction of the prices of protected, as against the unprotected article, and those which have been the most sedulously guarded by protection, amounting even to prohibition, have fallen most.

The price of articles which were formerly supplied us by Great Britain, and which we now manufacture for ourselves, or which, in other words, are wholly, or in part, excluded by our tariff, have, doubtless, fallen somewhat in price in England, in consequence of our system. The honorable Senator from South Carolina (Mr. H.) seems to consider that as one of its tendencies, and it is through this medium of a reduction in the price of the manufactured article, that the duty is to operate as a tax upon the exporter. Admitting the gentleman to be correct in his position (in which I am happy to concur with him) that the tendency of our protecting system is to reduce the price of the protected article in the British market, it can do it on no other principle than that of increased competition, or lessening the demand, while the supply continues the same.

If this be the mode of operation, it will be evident, on a little reflection, that it will act not alone on the protected, but on the unprotected articles also, and tend to a general reduction of the price in all.

We have, for example, directed the labor of one hundred thousand individuals to the manufacturing of sundry articles—say, for instance, woollens and cottons. These do not merely come into competition with, but they supersede the market for the product of one hundred thousand British laborers in the same business. These branches of business will be at once overdone to that extent, and consequently, become depressed. Capital and labor will be, therefore, withdrawn from them, and vested in other branches, to which the mischief has not extended; consequently; there would soon follow an adjustment and distribution of the surplus labor and capital among the various branches of manufacturers, and the over production distributed through all. Every thing would be more or less affected by it, and a reduction in the price of manufactured articles, generally, would be the consequence. I am, however, inclined to think that gentlemen much overrate the value of our market to England, and the effect of our legislation upon her. But, if it operate permanently to depress the price of the protected article, it would, in the way I have mentioned, have a more general and extended operation. In England, business of all kinds is pushed to the greatest possible extent. Every chord is drawn to its utmost tension; so that, touch but one, and it instantly vibrates through the whole connected system.

Much pains are taken by gentlemen to account for the reduction of prices, especially upon protected articles. The Senator from Virginia (Mr. TYLER) attributes it to a diminution in the amount of the circulating medium, and the consequent rise in the value of money. But the cause which he refers to had produced its full effect, and ceased to operate, long before 1824. Money was as scarce, nay, much scarcer, in the United States, and dearer too, if labor be, as I believe it is conceded to be, the true criterion of value, than it has been at any subsequent period. Banks had, long before that time, resumed the payment of specie, and all the necessities of life, manufactured articles excepted, had sunk to the very lowest point of depression. Raw cotton, too, had gone down, but not yet to its minimum, for it had not then fairly overwhelmed the market with its abundance.

But let us not wander in search of causes which lie at our doors; the reduction in the price of cotton fabrics, for instance, is occasioned partly by the excessive production of the raw material, which has reduced that material to its present low price; to home competition, and the steadiness of demand and supply, enabling the manufacturer to produce the fabric to the best possible advantage, and sell it on the lowest terms; add to this some improvements in machinery, and much in the conduct and management of the establishments themselves, and you have the aggregate of the causes which have produced this extraordinary effect; and surely it is no unpleasing occurrence to those who have supported this system, through every vicissitude, and staked their fame upon its result, that benefits have flowed in upon the country, connected with its operation, which even its enemies can trace to no other adequate cause.

But the Senator from South Carolina, (Mr. H.) tells us, and the same idea has been again and again reiterated by gentlemen, that, whatever may be the effect of this system upon other portions of the Union, to the South—especially the elder portions of the Southern States—it is every thing that is abhorred and pernicious—a blight, a mildew, a withering curse. Sir, epithet and denunciation prove nothing, except the warmth of those who utter them. If injury has been inflicted upon that section of the Union by the tariff, the mode of operating that injury can surely be pointed out. It can affect it by none but visible and sensible means, and must, as I conceive, be confined to a reduction in the price of the staple of the country, limiting the extent of the demand at home or abroad, or enhancing the price of the commodities purchased by the people.

I have already shown that the price of the staple (raw cotton) is, in some measure, sustained by the tariff—so far, at least, as it has converted cotton lands to the culture of sugar, and thereby limited the excess of production which would otherwise necessarily have sunk the article even below its present price. I have, also, heretofore shown, that the British manufacturer is

able to purchase of us all that he wishes to purchase, without looking to us for the means of payment. That it is for his interest to purchase to the full extent of his market for the manufactured article; that, therefore, the extent of the market for the raw material, at home and abroad, is equal to what it would have been without the tariff. This view of the case is strengthened by the fact that, since 1824, the quantity of cotton sold has increased in a ratio equal to that of former years, and the price has not sunk in as great a ratio. I have shown, too, so far as a negative can be shown, that the price of protected articles has not enhanced in consequence of the protection. And no counter evidence, whatever, has been brought forward to prove that a single article has risen higher, or fallen less, in consequence of protection, except, indeed, the finest woollen fabrics, articles of luxury, in which we have not yet been able to compete with the British manufacturers.

The Senator from South Carolina has said that the tariff, by enhancing the price of the manufactured article, tends to diminish its consumption among the poorer classes; thus limiting the extent of the demand, and compelling first the merchant, then the manufacturer, then the *producer*, to come down to the lowest price at which each can carry on his operations, and thus casting a part of the burdens of protection upon the producer, as such, over and above his share of the burden as consumer. However true this might be, in a possible state of things, the very reverse of it is known to be the fact with respect to the cotton fabric. If the tariff has, in fact, compelled the British manufacturer to work cheaper, and the merchant to receive less profits, effects which, by the gentleman's own hypothesis, must be produced before any of the burden can fall on the producer of the raw material, as they both stand between him and the consumer—if the merchant and manufacturer are compelled to take less profit, the price of the article is, at once, reduced to consumers in all parts of the world, except the United States; and the price being reduced, it is brought into more general use among the poorer classes, and its sale becomes more extensive in nineteen-twentieths of the markets of the world. I do not say that the gentleman's position is sound; but, if it be so, this is the first consequence that flows from it. And, sir, with regard to the consumption of cotton fabrics in the United States, which the gentleman seems to suppose is, or may be, diminished by the protecting system, his whole theory is built upon a supposed augmentation in price, the very reverse of which we know to exist. Increased consumption, too, the natural consequence of a diminished price, and more ability to purchase, is obvious to the most careless observer, especially in the West. No special injury has, therefore, resulted to the South by this operation of the tariff.

But, to show that the *producer* pays the duty on the imported article, a case is put, well calculated to puzzle, but really involving a mere sophism. I refer to the case of the bale of woollens which, the gentleman from South Carolina has supposed, is received directly in exchange for cottons exported by the Southern planter, and which is stopped at the custom house, and forty of the hundred pieces which it contains taken out, as a tax to the Government. [P. 17, printed speech.] Now, as to the supposition that the bale of woollens is imported for the *consumption* of the planter, I have nothing to object against it, in the view of the subject that I am now taking. He does pay the duty, not in his capacity of *producer*, or *exporter*, but in the capacity of *importer* and *consumer*—and, analyze the transaction, separate it into its four natural elements, which have, by the honorable Senator, been unnaturally combined, and it will be obvious. Let the Southern planter export his crop, lay it down in the Liverpool market, and sell it for the best price he can in cash. This, indeed, is always done: for there is no such thing as barter there, except through the medium of money, or bills, which are for all effective purposes money. Now, he sells his cotton for just the same price, whether he intends to bring home broad cloths or money. Here the transaction of the *producer* and the *exporter* ceases; the cotton planter has for his crop *cash*, which he may bring home with him, or, what is still better, leave on deposit with his English banker; his bills on that banker he sells to the Philadelphia or New York merchant, at a premium, and he has his cash at home, to be disposed of at pleasure. The Ohio farmer sends pork and beef to New Orleans, which is shipped to Charleston, or the Kentucky drover takes his horses,

mules, and live stock, through the Saluda Gap, and they are sold to the planter. The planter pays with the cash which he has brought home, or by a draft on his banker in New York, and the exactions at the custom house do not, thus far, affect the transaction in the remotest degree. The New York merchant who has bought the draft on England, pays it out for British goods, and brings them home; *he* pays the duty? Now, if the cotton planter purchases one half these goods, and the Ohio farmer the other half, at the same price, is it not obvious that each pays his *equal* share of the duty? No refinement, no sophistry, however ingenious, can change the true character of the transaction. The consumer, and not the producer, pays the tax, and the several sections of the Union pay it in proportion to the amount they consume. As respects the importer and consumer, if the *protected* article is permanently enhanced in value by the duty laid on it for the purpose of protection, it is thus far a burden, and its propriety and policy must be tested by comparing and balancing, as nearly as may be, its evils with its benefits. But, if the price of the protected article be not enhanced, no burden whatever is borne, except what is necessary to sustain the revenue of the country, and no advantage is given by it to one class of our citizens over another.

But, the honorable Senator from South Carolina (Mr. H.) has told you, that, while other sections of the Union are flourishing, increasing in population, and rising in wealth, the condition of the South, that of his own State especially, under the operation of this system, is not merely one of unexampled depression, but of great and all-pervading distress; their once busy and populous cities crumbling into ruin, their fields abandoned, their hospitable mansions deserted, and the husbandman, with a heavy and despairing heart, tearing himself from the scenes of his childhood and the bones of his ancestors, to seek, in the wilderness, exemption from the oppression with which this policy has overwhelmed him.

Is this fancy, or is it fact? I am inclined to think the picture greatly overdrawn; although the glowing eloquence, the rich and fervid imagination, and the deep and impassioned tone of feeling in which it is shadowed forth, tends to give it a welcome entrance into the mind, before it has passed the ordeal of the judgment. But, in determining upon fact, simple every-day fact, I would prefer the conclusions of a less powerful and a less excited intellect. There is too much of poetry in the description; it forcibly reminds one of the beautiful and eloquent lines of Doctor Goldsmith, in which he describes, with so much apparent truth and real feeling, the deserted fields and desolate habitations of the industrious peasantry of England, driven from their humble but happy homes, to seek shelter from oppression in the solitary woods of savage America—

“Where wild Altama spreads its swamps around,

“And Niagara stuns with thundering sound—”

And it is said, I know not how correctly, that our poet lived and died strong in the conviction of the general correctness of the picture which he drew of the progressive decay and desolation of his country. But, sir, England *was*, in fact, increasing in population, and so also is South Carolina. The last census shows a small increase in the free population of the State, and a large increase of the slaves. The fields also must be cultivated as heretofore: for they yield an increased export product, and we are told that they now raise a much larger proportion than formerly of grain and live stock, for their own consumption. Though by no means disposed to admit that South Carolina is plunged as deeply into the abyss of misery and despair as has been here depicted, yet I doubt not that she prospers less than formerly, and less also than most other sections of the Union: but for this there are abundant causes, independent of the tariff.

The Southern planter does not, like the hardy farmer of the North and West, lay his own hand to the plough; he neither holds nor drives; the culture of the fields is left to the overseer and the slaves, and their cultivation is without skill and without care. Year after year, the same fields are subjected to the same crop, and the same unceasing and unchanging tillage, without any means being used to renew or reinvigorate the soil. The fields are soon worn down by excessive cultivation, and cease to yield, as heretofore, an abundant

harvest. Extensive emigration is also without doubt one of the causes which operates to check the prosperity of the older portions of the Southern States; but this emigration is induced by causes, and instigated by feelings, very different from those to which the gentleman has ascribed it. It is not want, or misery, or oppression, that induces it; the emigrant curses neither his country nor his lot; and his journeying is undertaken and executed with feelings the reverse of anguish and despair. Sir, it is the rich and fertile lands of the West, of which he may become the proprietor almost for nothing—a charming country in reality, fresh, and rich, and fair, almost beyond example, but to which the imagination does not fail to add new beauties, and color even with ideal and unreal charms—it is this which operates upon the hopes, and elates the spirits, of the young and ardent sons of the South and East, and leads them to part from their fair fields and happy homes on the Atlantic shore, for fairer fields and happier homes in the far distant West. Hence, sir, the giant stride with which our population has borne its march westward, the “lion’s bound” with which we have sprung into the forest.

But this spirit of emigration, year by year, drains from the sea board of South Carolina her most hardy, vigorous, and enterprising population. Cotton, the object of their culture, can be raised cheaper and more abundantly on the new and rich lands of Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and the Territories of Florida and Arkansas; and, unlike the cumbrous article of grain and its products, can be transported from the interior at a small per centum on its market value.

I take leave to refer also to another cause, named by the honorable Senator from Kentucky, and which has, with the foregoing, a combined operation. The repeal of the laws of primogeniture—the equal distribution of the real estate among all the children, sons and daughters alike—however favorable to the wealth and prosperity of the people in other sections of the Union, does, owing to the peculiar situation and habits of the South, seriously affect their condition. Judging from the statistical tables which show the comparative increase of population in different sections of the Union, and comparing that of South Carolina with others, I am led to the conclusion, that one-fourth part of the free born of that State, which reach the years of maturity, emigrate; and by the existing laws they carry with them to their new homes, not merely their share of the personal estate of the family from which they are descended, but also of the *land* and *slaves*, which form the substratum of the wealth of the country. Thus, year after year, is there a regular and continual drain of the best and most efficient population of the State, and their wealth also—even their real property pays an annual rent, if I may so call it, to her emigration. But this is not all. The great increase of the slaves over that of the free population, shows that the emigrants do not generally take with them their proportion of slaves, but that *they* remain as heretofore, in some measure regardant to the soil. They have risen now to more than one-half of the population of that State, and are fast gaining upon the whites in the ratio of increase; they, indeed, compose almost the whole laboring population of the country; they labor without judgment, for their intellects are not cultivated—without energy, for they labor without motive; hence, the acquisition of wealth from *labor*, its great and only real basis, must be small in a country situated like this, compared with what it is, where every man, with his own hand, cultivates his own farm, or watches over its improvement; where all are laborers, and all intelligent, industrious, and persevering—careful of the present, and provident of the future.

Sir, the curse of slavery, and not the tariff, is in truth the withering curse, which blights the fair hopes of this fair and otherwise happy and favored land. It is not so much the drain upon her population, for in this other and prosperous States share her lot; but it is, that, while the sound and wholesome portion of the population flows off—the bold and enterprising freeman—the slave remains fixed to the soil, yearly consuming more and more of its products, and yearly displacing and sending into exile (if emigration be exile) more of the free born of the land. I need not follow out the picture in anticipation of its consequences; the subject is one of deep regret and gloomy forebodings.

But one thing more will I take occasion here to remark. In many sections

of the Union, and in foreign countries, too, public opinion has greatly erred as to the general feeling and conduct of the individual masters towards their slaves. So far as I have observed, (and my observation has been somewhat extensive, especially in Virginia and Kentucky) there is nothing in it to shock humanity. On the contrary, the feelings of the masters toward them, appear to be that of kindness and affection. And this evil, cast upon our Southern brethren, not by their own acts, or of their own choice, but by the cupidity of a foreign nation, while we remained her colonies, is one for which they are entitled to any thing rather than reproach and censure. And it is an evil, which, in the present state of public feeling, the Legislature of the Union cannot, in the more southern sections of our country, either remove or mitigate. Philanthropy indulges visions of this kind, at present, in vain.

Another mode in which the same cause operates injuriously to that section of the Union, is, that it lessens their capacity for commercial enterprise. A negro slave is unfit for a ship carpenter or a sailor, and in a country where there is no laboring class except slaves, ships cannot be built, or manned, to the same advantage, as in the Eastern and Middle States, where laborers are freemen, and possess intelligence and enterprise for every undertaking, however arduous, or however varied. The navigating interest, therefore, independently of the tariff, must centre elsewhere than in the Southern States. And finally, the well known and familiar habits of the Southern People—free, liberal, uncalculating—living to the full extent of their means, however ample, and trusting to their land and slaves as a perpetual supply, and beyond that improvident of the future. Time brings with it an increase of population, but not of wealth; and the decay and exhaustion of their soil, and the fall in the price of their staple, produces a depression which is severely felt, but which is unfortunately attributed to that which, of all things, is most remote from its real cause.

Need I add another to this long and mournful list of causes for the calamities under which our Southern brethren suffer, and of which they complain? I have explained the causes of the alleged decay of their navigating interest. Why is their commerce (as the honorable Senator says it is) transferred into the hands of the merchants of Philadelphia and New York, and carried on by their capital? I have already spoken of the habits of the Northern and Middle States—the steady eye which they have to the future—their disposition to accumulate and embody capital, and their skill to direct it to every prosperous enterprise. They have the ships—they have the seamen—they have habits of life and a turn of mind fitted to mercantile pursuits—and they have capital; with or without a tariff, the commerce of the South must have fallen into their hands.

These causes combined, operate on the city of Charleston, the decay of which has been so eloquently and feelingly depicted by the gentleman from South Carolina; and though disposed to think his coloring somewhat too dark, I cannot for a moment doubt the general correctness of the sad picture which he has drawn—that there has been a great and marked decay in the wealth, the business, and the prosperity, of that city. But, sir, independently of those causes which I have named, and which operate alike upon the older portions of South Carolina, there is one other, which tends to depress the business of Charleston alone. There have sprung up in the interior, a range of populous and flourishing towns, Columbia, Augusta, and Camden, which, within a few past years, have been rapidly growing in commercial importance, and have cut off almost wholly the interior trade from Charleston, making that city a mere place of transit, or rather of shipment.

Sir, these causes which I have detailed—and I appeal to Southern gentlemen for their correctness and truth—have operated with combined effect, for years, upon the destinies of this people; and are they not sufficient, though checked and opposed as they may be by the riches of nature, which an all bountiful Providence has scattered over the land—are they not sufficient to produce all the depression and all the misery which is vainly supposed to spring from the protecting system?

I cannot, therefore, on the most full and careful consideration which I have been able to give this subject, concur with gentlemen in the opinion that the protecting system operates oppressively on the Southern, or any other sec-

tion of the Union. In the West, so far as experience can test its efficacy, it has produced, and is producing, all the good which its friends and supporters have ever predicted. From the state of ruinous depression to which agricultural interests had sunk, in 1824—an era which our Western farmers will long bear in remembrance—they have gradually risen, under the fostering influence of this system, connected and consorted with that of our internal improvement, until they have reached a point of prosperity, which, though not rich, or towering, is sufficient to spread comfort and gladness over our happy land.

Sir, entertaining these views of the tendency and effects of the protective system, I yield to it my hearty, and shall give it my decided support. I do not, by any means, hold, that our present system is perfect; there are, doubtless, in some of its leading principles, and many of its details, much that may be modified, amended, and improved; and I am willing, too, to sacrifice something upon the altar of conciliation and peace; but, I will not consent to surrender the principle of protection, or so to mould its details, as to prostrate and ruin the interests which it has reared and cherished.



